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needed.A criminal conviction carries with it the reliability
that comes from having to produce a sufficient quantity of
credible evidence to overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence and convince a jury of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.An unadjudicated act, without a corresponding standard of proof,lacks many of these
attributes.Without a standard of proof requirement, the jury
is left in the dark as to how convinced it must be that the
defendant actually committed the unadjudicated acts. The
jury is uninformed about whether it has to be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, whether more likely than not is
sufficient, or whether it simply has to decide which witness
it believes more. Without any guidance, the jury's determination too easily devolves into the last inquiry.This is especiaUy troubling given the defendant's complete lack of credibility. Unlike at the guilt phase of a trial where the defendant has a presumption of innocence, the capital defendant
at the sentencing phase has absolutely no credibility with
the jury, given that he or she has just been convicted of a
capital murder. Without any guidance, coupled with the
defendant's complete lack of credibility, the current practice in Virginia makes it far too easy for a jury's decision to
impose death to rest on flimsy and suspect evidence.
The testimony of the jailhouse inmates in Eaton's sentencing hearing manifests this fear. Two inmates testified
that Eaton had fashioned a weapon which he planned to
use to overpower a guard and escape from prison. Nothing
in the court's opinion indicates the presence of physical

evidence, such as the weapon, to corroborate the testimony
of these inmates. Essentially,it was Eaton's word against the
word of these jailhouse inmates. Although in the instant
case criminal convictions of violence were also offered to
prove future dangerousness, nothing in Virginia's statutory
scheme prevents a death sentence from being imposed
solely on the basis of unadjudicated acts.A mere swearing
contest between convicts hardly satisfies the constitutional
requirement of a heightened degree of reliability in a jury's
decision to impose life or death.
IV. Conclusion
This case epitomizes everything that is troubling about
the Fourth Circuit's current death penalty jurisprudence.
On the one hand, the court of appeals, through re-characterization and dismissive language, bends over backwards to
uphold what has been deemed an unconstitutional practice
and prevent the jury from considering relevant and indisputably accurate evidence. On the other hand, the court,
again by re-characterizing the defendant's claim, avoids
answering the defendant's Due Process objection, and thus
permits the admission of relevant but inadequate and highly dubious evidence.At some point fairness must prevail.
Summary and analysis by:
Tommy Barret
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FACTS
Half brothers Larry Gilbert and J.D. Gleaton were convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in South
Carolina state court for the 1977 shooting and stabbing of a
service station worker. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed both convictions but vacated the sentences and
remanded for resentencing. 2 A second jury sentenced
Gilbert and Gleaton to death on remand. On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed their sentences,
and, subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 3 The half brothers next sought post-conviction
relief (hereinafter PCR) from their convictions and sen-

'Gilbertv. Moore, 134 E3d 642,645 (4th Cir. 1998). The half
brothers were under the influence of illegal drugs at the time of
the murder. They also robbed the service station.
'Gilbert, 134 E3d at 645.
3
1d. at 645-46. See State v. Gilbert,456 U.S. 984 (1982).

tences in state court. The state PCR court rejected their
claims, and both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
4
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Gilbert and Gleaton requested habeas relief from the
United States District Court, Fourth Circuit. In 1985, a federal magistrate recommended a grant of summary judgment
in favor of the State on all claims. In 1988, the court adopted that recommendation, granting summary judgment and
dismissing the petitions. Gilbert and Gleaton filed motions
requesting the court to vacate the judgment and allow an
amendment to their petitions. In 1991, the court vacated
the judgment and permitted the half brothers to amend
their petitions.The cases were remanded to the magistrate
5
judge.

4

Gilbert,134 E3d at 646.
1d. at 646.The court remanded the case with instructions for
the magistrate to hold the case in abeyance for sixty days to allow
Gilbert and Gleaton to pursue additional remedies in state court.
5
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Gilbert and Gleaton filed their second PCR petitions in
state court, and the court rejected all but two of their
claims, deeming them successive.6 The two undismissed
claims were that a jury instruction regarding presumed malice constituted reversible error and that the State had systematically removed prospective black jurors from the
venire in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
consisting of a fair cross-section of the community.7 After
conducting an evidentiary hearing on these two issues, the
state PCR court determined that the jury instruction, while
unconstitutional, constituted harmless error and that the
fair cross-section claim was successive.' The South Carolina
Supreme Court denied certiorari, and while those proceedings were pending, the district court complied with the
state's request to waive exhaustion as to the remaining
issues and resume the federal proceedings. 9
On federal habeas, the United States District Court,
Fourth Circuit, determined that the jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of malice
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
error was not harmless, thus entitling Gilbert and Gleaton
to habeas relief.'0 The court rejected the remainder of their
claims, which included a conflict of interest claim against
defense counsel, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
and a due process claim based upon the systematic removal
of blacks from the venire." A panel of the United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district
court's decision.'2 Subsequently,"a majority of the judges in
active service" voted to rehear the appeals en banc. 13

6

id.
'Under South Carolina's statutory scheme, malice is one element
of the offense of murder. South Carolina CodeAnnotated Section 163-10 defines murder as"the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied:' See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391

(1991) (holding that jury instruction to presume malice from use of
a deadly weapon constituted unconstitutional burden-shifting and
was not harmless error in context of defendant's defense and jury's
likely interpretation of unconstitutional instruction).
'Gilbert,134 E3d at 646.
9Id.
'Old.

"Id.at 652-57. Gleaton asserted three additional claims. He
contended that the trial court allowed the jury to weigh what was
essentially the same aggravating factor twice in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; that the court's failure to
exclude for cause jurors who indicated they could not consider
lack of a criminal record as a mitigating circumstance violated his
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and that the trial
court should have issued jury instructions sua sponte to the effect
that the jury should not draw a negative inference with respect to
Gleaton's guilt from his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent and that the jury should not treat Gilbert's confession as evidence of Gleaton's guilt. Id.at 657.
"Gilbert, 134 E3d at 645. See Gilbert v. Moore, 121 E3d 144

1997).
(4th Cir.
'3Gilbert,134 E3d at 645.

HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
upheld the finding that the jury instruction on malice
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof on that element from the prosecution to the defense but determined
that this error was harmless. 4 The court rejected the petitioners' conflict of interest argument based on joint representation, finding that the petitioners had not demonstrated
the existence of any actual conflict of interest at the guilt
phase and that they had waived their right to conflict-free
counsel at the sentencing phase.' 5 Additionally, the court
found that Gilbert and Gleaton had received effective assistance of counsel and that even if they had not, they could
not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v.
Washington,'6 and thus could not obtain relief on that
ground." Because none of the jurors that Gleaton claimed
to be improperly qualified were seated on the jury, the
court rejected Gleaton's argument that he had been denied
his right to an impartial jury by the trial court's refusal to
strike for cause jurors who had indicated that they could
not consider lack of a criminal record as a mitigating circumstance. 8 Finally, the court determined that the remaining three claims were procedurally defaulted.' 9
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

The Fourth Circuit Serves Up Its Special:
Harmless Error of Constitutional Magnitude

The court of appeals accepted South Carolina's concession that the jury instruction concerning the element of
malice impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense and constituted an error of constitutional magnitude. Thus, the court proceeded to the
question of whether the error was harmless. Emphasizing
the great extent to which federal courts have traditionally
deferred to state conviction and sentencing decisions, the
court reaffirmed previous holdings concerning the proper
standard for appellate review of constitutional error com141d.
'"1d.at 652.
16466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that standard for determining
ineffectiveness of counsel was whether defendant received reasonably effective assistance of counsel and, if not, whether there
was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different had defense counsel not committed the errors rendering
his or her assistance ineffective).
"Gilbert, 134 E3d at 655.
"Id. The court noted that his use of peremptory challenges to
remove those jurors did not constitute a violation of his right to an
impartial jury.
'91d.at 656.This case marks yet another instance in which the
Fourth Circuit has met en banc to reverse a previous decision that
was somehow favorable to a capital defendant. For what has
proven to be a premature celebration of the victory that the
court's previous decision represented for capital defendants, see
footnote 39 of the Case Summary of Arnold,Cap. Def.J., Vol. 10,
No. 1, p. 7. See also Case Summary of Mackall,this issue.
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mitted at the state trial court level.The court stated that a
federal court may not grant habeas relief based upon a trial
error of constitutional magnitude unless that error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
...
verdict," or, at least, the appellate court entertains grave
doubt as to whether the error had such effect."
The court of appeals set forth the legal definition of
"malice" and subsequently considered the evidence before
the jury to determine what effect the erroneous instruction
may have had upon the jury." The court considered
Gilbert's confession along with evidence of the nature and
number (eight) of the wounds inflicted upon the victim
and determined that the jury was presented with "overwhelming evidence of malice: 22The court de-emphasized
the fact that the wounds were inflicted in the course of a
struggle and that neither defendant had demonstrated an
intention to use a weapon before the struggle with the service station attendant ensued. Based upon its take on the
evidence, the court concluded, "there can be no doubt that
the erroneous instruction had no effect whatsoever on the
verdicts, much less a substantial and injurious one."2 The
court stated that based upon the evidence before it, no reasonable jury could have found that the killing was not intentional or, by implication, committed without malice, and
thus, the court deemed the error harmless.24
This retrospective analysis of the jury's decision presupposed the correctness of the outcome of the trial and
failed to recognize the dynamic nature of jury decision-making. The court of appeals did not inquire as to how the jury
might have proceeded in making its decision if it had not
received the presumed malice instruction. For example, the
jury might have focused upon the fact that the wounds
were inflicted after the struggle began-a fact that was dispositive for the Yates Court, which reached a result that was
opposite from the outcome in this case. 25As unfair as it may
seem, the court's harmless error analysis illustrates the
exceedingly difficult standard that must be met by defense
counsel who hope to use trial error of constitutional magnitude as grounds for obtaining relief for a capital defendant.

II. Joint Representation in Capital Cases
The defendants claimed that their joint representation
had violated their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, which encompassed the right to conflictfree representation. 26 The court of appeals found that the
defendants did not demonstrate the existence of an actual
conflict of interest.The court noted that their unified guilt
phase strategy had been to challenge the voluntariness of
their confessions and that their interests with respect to all
legal and factual issues did not "diverge 27A good-faith
analysis of whether joint representation creates an actual
conflict should necessarily include consideration of the
relationship between the fact of joint representation and
the nature of co-defendants' guilt phase strategies. Under
the requisite scrutiny, co-defendants' unified trial strategies
may prove to be a function of joint representation and, perhaps, not in the best interest of one or both of the co-defendants.This court did not engage in such an analysis.
The court noted that at the sentencing phase, Gilbert
and Gleaton had knowingly waived their right to conflictfree counsel. Additionally, the court explained that "the
record demonstrates that Petitioners decided that they did
not wish to cast blame upon each other and that they
instead wanted to pursue a joint defense: 28 Again, perhaps
if Gilbert and Gleaton had not been represented by the
same attorney and had consulted someone other than that
attorney as to the advisability of maintaining a unified strategy,they would have opted to pursue different strategies at
the sentencing phase and might have obtained different
results.
The mandates of fundamental fairness dictate that trial
courts hearing capital cases of jointly represented defendants should appoint an amicus to talk to each individual
defendant about the advisability of joint representation
from the perspective of that individual defendant's interests. Courts have shown a willingness to provide this service in other contexts.The heightened obligations imposed
upon courts in capital cases would seem to justify the
allowance of such a minimal protection.

M. What Effective Assistance of Counsel Means: Is
Strickland a "Clearly Guilty" Rule?

-Gilbert,134 E3d at 647 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750,776 (1946) (holding that trial error of constitutional
magnitude that had substantial and injurious effect upon the trial's
outcome may not be considered harmless)). See O'Neal v.
McAnich, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995) (holding that federal habeas
court must grant relief if the court entertains grave doubt as to
whether trial error of constitutional magnitude had a substantial
and injurious effect upon the jury's verdict).
Gilbert, 134 E3d at 647-52.
22Id.

'AId.
24

In this case, the court of appeals considered an astonishing assortment of alleged deficiencies of defense counsel
at both the guilt and sentencing phases. Gilbert and Gleaton
argued that their counsel had "failed to make an appropriate
independent inquiry into the circumstances of the crime;
interviewed only two of the seventeen witnesses for the
prosecution; failed to examine the physical evidence; met
with them for a total of less than three and one-half hours;
and failed to study sufficiently the then newly enacted death

at 650.

1d.at 652.
2
See supra note 7.

Gilbert,134 E3d at 652.

27

Id.

281d. at 653.
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penalty procedures."2 The court dismissed these arguments wholesale, noting that the petitioners had failed to
show that these deficiencies had impacted their counsel's
performance and thus prejudiced them.30
Gilbert and Gleaton also challenged their counsel's
performance during the resentencing hearing, noting
that counsel had failed both to retain either a pharmacological expert or a psychiatric expert and to conduct
a Sufficient investigation into their background, which
they contended would have yielded a number of character witnesses who could have testified as to mitigating
circumstances.-" The court of appeals found that defense
counsel's failure to retain an expert did not fall outside
of the wide range of professionally acceptable conduct.
In addressing and rejecting the second component of
the petitioners' complaint, the court noted,".. .counsel
is not constitutionally required to interview every family member, neighbor, or coworker in the search for mitigating evidence.

3 2

Ultimately, the court of appeals found that even if
Gilbert and Gleaton had demonstrated that their counsel's conduct fell outside of the acceptable range, they
had not demonstrated prejudice. The court concluded,
"[t]he evidence that Petitioners argue would have been
obtained if counsel had performed competently does
dot undermine our confidence in the verdict:"' Once
again, the court presupposed the guilt of the defendants
and the appropriateness of the jury's verdict and sentencing decision. Defense counsel's omissions at the
guilt and sentencing phases may very well have been
crucial to the jury's decision at both phases. Perhaps by
interviewing any of the fifteen of the seventeen prosecution witnesses that he did not interview, considering
the physical evidence, retaining an expert, or talking to
another family member, neighbor, or coworker, defense
counsel might have found a crucial bit of evidence that
could have produced doubt in a juror's mind as to the
appropriateness of the imposition of the death sentence
and thus impacted the jury's deliberations in a significant way.The court's disregard for the dynamic nature of
pretrial investigation, trial preparation, and jury deliberation is manifest in the appallingly low standard that it
sets for the performance of capital defense counsel.
As a whole, the Fourth Circuit has demonstrated its
great willingness and propensity to stretch to find
effective assistance of counsel. The courts' ineffective
assistance of counsel analyses, however, certainly do
not in any sense identify what good or even competent
counsel should do in a capital case. As all capital

"Ild.at 654.
"Gilbert, 134 E3d at 654.
31ld.
-Id. at 655.
"3Id.

defense counsel certainly must know, representation of
capital defendants entails an enormous amount of legal,
moral, and ethical responsibility. What may suffice to
insulate an attorney from the charge of ineffective assistance of counsel is often insufficient to provide the
quality of representation that defendants on trial for
4

their lives deserve.3

IV. The Unkind World of Procedural Default
The court disposed of three of petitioners' claims on
grounds of procedural default. 35 While South Carolina's
procedural default rules differ somewhat from Virginia's
scheme, this case is instructive of the importance of preserving issues on both state and federal grounds at every
level of litigation. Specifically, this case highlights the
importance of carefully reading jury instructions so as
to identify potential arguments and ensure that they are
not procedurally defaulted.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Duprey

"According to Standard 4-1.2(c) of theAmerican BarAssociation
Standards for Criminal Justice,"[s]ince the death penalty differs from
other criminal penalties in its finality,defense counsel in a capital case
should respond to this difference by making extraordinary efforts on
behalf of the accusedr See generally the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
'he court rejected the claims that petitioners were deprived of
their due process right by the prosecutions systematic removal of black
prospective jurors from the venire, that the trial court had deprived
Gleaton of his Eighth and FourteenthAmendment rights by its instruction to the jury to consider essentially the same aggravating factor twice,
and that the trial court should have issued jury instructions sua sponte
ordering the jury not to draw a negative inference from Gleaton's exercise of his FfthAmendment right and not to consider Gilbert's confession as evidence of Gleaton's guilt. Giber4 134 F3d at 656.

